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Addressing Climate Change: Have the Political Winds 
Shifted in Favor of a Carbon Tax? 
Jesse Reiblich∗ 
Policymaking to combat climate change has been almost 
nonexistent despite the scientific community’s consensus that the 
time to act is now. Regardless, climate change remains a volatile 
political issue that divides our nation and its legislators. Advocates 
of reducing carbon emissions have traditionally endorsed several 
tools available to policymakers and administrative agencies in order 
to curb climate change: rulemaking under the Clean Air Act, cap-
and-trade, and carbon taxes. Carbon tax legislation has gained 
traction after endorsements from both sides of the political aisle, and 
because it could be used to raise funds to reduce the United States’ 
deficit. Even policymakers that categorically refuse to raise taxes 
may be willing to introduce a carbon tax if it is coupled with tax 
reductions elsewhere. This Article considers these traditional 
options for reducing carbon emissions and argues that recent 
political rhetoric seems to set the stage for passing a carbon tax 
where passage was once believed to be impossible.  
INTRODUCTION 
While experts debate both the existence and causes of climate 
change, the growing consensus among scientists, and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,1 is that climate change 
is a real phenomenon that has been caused, at least in part, by 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions.2 Likewise, the consensus 
is that this phenomenon is a problem that needs to be addressed as 
soon as possible in order to avoid massive, irrevocable climate 
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 1. Organization, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is an intergovernmental, scientific 
body comprised of 195 countries that was established by the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization 
in order to “provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of 
knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic 
impacts.” Id.  
 2. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Susan Solomon et al. 
eds., 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth 
_assessment_report_wg1_report_the_physical_science_basis.htm. 
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change.3 Most scientists agree that reducing the carbon dioxide 
humans emit into the environment is a necessary step for slowing 
down or stopping climate change.4 Logically, the next question is 
one of prevention: what is the best way to effectively reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions? 
In the United States there are several possibilities on the table. 
First, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency could reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions through its “command and control” 
powers under the various provisions of the Clean Air Act.5Second, 
Congress could implement a cap-and-trade scheme like the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme implemented by the 
European Union to comply with its member countries’ obligations 
under the Kyoto Protocol.6 Third, Congress could also implement a 
plan similar to the sulfur dioxide trading scheme the U.S. set up to 
curb acid rain.7 Finally, Congress could levy a carbon tax on carbon 
dioxide emissions like Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have done.8 
This final option is attractive because it would simultaneously 
reduce the deficit. 
This Article first considers some of the most popular proposed 
methods the United States could employ to reduce its carbon 
emissions and attempts to determine which method, or methods, the 
United States should implement. Part I will introduce and briefly 
discuss the three methods of reducing carbon dioxide emissions that 
are currently front-runners in the U.S. Parts II through IV will 
consider the pros and cons of trying to reduce carbon emissions 
under each of the methods introduced in Part I—the Clean Air Act, 
a cap-and-trade emissions scheme, and a carbon tax, respectively. 
Finally, Part V presents a tax “swap” as perhaps the best option. 
                                                                                                             
 3. Id. at 2. According to the IPCC, the world’s average temperature has risen 
0.74 degrees in the past century. The IPCC estimates that the world’s average 
temperature will rise an additional three degrees over the next century if CO2 
levels continue to rise at their current rate. Id.  
 4. See id. at 5. The IPCC’s data suggests that “[m]ost of the observed 
increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely 
due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” Id.  
 5. See infra Part II.  
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part III.A. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
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I. OVERVIEW 
The three methods of carbon emissions reductions compared in 
this paper are regulatory controls under the Clean Air Act, cap-and 
trade, and a tax on carbon.  
In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA,9 the Environmental 
Protection Agency could try to curb climate change by regulating 
carbon dioxide emissions under several different titles of the Clean 
Air Act. Under Title I, the EPA could identify carbon dioxide as a 
criteria pollutant under the Act10 and set a National Ambient Air 
Quality Standard (NAAQS) for carbon dioxide.11 Under Title II, the 
EPA could further reduce motor vehicle carbon dioxide emissions.12 
Finally, under Title V, the EPA could attempt to regulate and reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions from major stationary sources of carbon 
dioxide emissions through the development of state implementation 
plans (SIPs) in conjunction with the states.13  
Cap-and-trade schemes involve implementing an overall cap on 
the amount of carbon dioxide emissions that the United States 
allows carbon dioxide producers to emit.14 Companies would then 
be given carbon credits that collectively equal the total cap amount 
of carbon dioxide emissions.15 Alternatively, a system could be 
devised which would allow producers to bid for and pay market 
value for these credits. Under a free allocation of credits system, 
producers that emit less than the amount allowed by their allotted 
credits could sell their excess credits to companies that need them to 
operate. Selling these excess credits to other companies provides an 
economic incentive for companies to emit less carbon dioxide than 
their carbon credits allow. Likewise, under this scheme the United 
States would be able to lower the overall cap as it wished in order to 
lower the total amount of carbon dioxide emissions of the country as 
                                                                                                             
 9. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (holding 
that greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, fall “well within the Clean Air 
Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant.’”).  
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2006) (establishing air quality criteria). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006) (defining National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (requiring the EPA to regulate “the 
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or 
new motor vehicle engines, which in [the EPA Administrator’s] judgment cause, 
or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare.”). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661–7661f (2006). 
 14. Cap and Trade, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov 
/captrade/ (last updated May 10, 2012). 
 15. Allowance Trading Basics, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa 
.gov/airmarkets/trading/basics.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2009).  
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a whole.16 By lowering its carbon dioxide emissions, the U.S. would 
combat further climate change.  
Finally, Congress could tax carbon dioxide emissions or the 
production of carbon-dioxide-emitting fossil fuels and electricity.17 
This tax could be raised or lowered each year depending on whether 
the U.S. met its annual goal of carbon dioxide emission reductions.18 
The goal of a carbon tax is to internalize the external costs of using 
fossil fuels, specifically the cost to society of releasing carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere.19 Currently, carbon dioxide emitters 
pay nothing for the effects of their emissions on the environment.20 
A carbon tax would also lower both industry-produced carbon 
dioxide emissions and consumer use of carbon-dioxide-emitting 
products.21 A carbon tax enjoys support on both sides of the political 
aisle because of its potential to produce revenue to reduce the United 
States’ deficit.22  
                                                                                                             
 16. Such a reduction could allow the United States to comply with 
international attempts to deal with climate change, such as the Kyoto Protocol. See 
Kyoto Protocol art. 3, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (under which the U.S. would 
have been required to reduce its overall emissions by 5% from 1990 levels). 
 17. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global 
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming 
Than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 31 (2009) (A tax on the production 
of fuels is an “upstream” carbon tax. A “downstream” carbon tax on users of fuels 
would be harder to implement and effectively enforce.). 
 18. Id. at 32–33. 
 19. Id. The cost to society of releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere in 
this case would be climate change.  
 20. Instead, carbon emissions are a negative externality borne by the public as 
a whole. Id. at 32 (explaining that the harmful effects of carbon dioxide emissions 
are currently a negative externality).  
 21. Producers might pay less as the cost of emitting increases. Likewise, 
consumers might consume less as the price of greenhouse gas intensive products 
increases. See IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 
WORKING GROUP III: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, ch. 13, at 755 (B. Metz, 
et al., eds., 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch13s13-
2-1-2.html (“Each emitter weighs the cost of emissions control against the cost of 
emitting and paying the tax; the end result is that polluters undertake to implement 
those emission reductions that are cheaper than paying the tax, but they do not 
implement those that are more expensive. Since every emitter faces a uniform tax 
on emissions per tonne of GHG (if energy, equipment and product markets are 
perfectly competitive), emitters will undertake the least expensive reductions 
throughout the economy, thereby equalizing the marginal cost of abatement (a 
condition for cost-effectiveness).”) (internal citation omitted) [hereinafter IPCC 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT]. 
 22. Former Representative Bob Inglis (R-S.C.) supports a carbon tax as a way 
to “account[] for the true cost of the fuels we use.” Brad Plumer, Could 
Republicans Ever Support a Carbon Tax? Bob Inglis Thinks So., WASH. POST, 
(Mar. 14, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog 
/wp/2013/03/14/could-republicans-ever-support-a-carbon-tax-bob-inglis-thinks-so.  
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II. REGULATIONS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
The United States could also use its existing regulatory powers 
under the Clean Air Act to curb climate change. The EPA can 
regulate carbon dioxide emissions under Titles I, II, V, or a 
combination of these Titles. In order for the EPA to regulate carbon 
dioxide under Title I, the EPA must identify carbon dioxide as a 
criteria pollutant and also set a National Ambient Air Quality 
Standard (NAAQS) for carbon dioxide.23 Likewise, the EPA can 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions from new motor vehicles under its 
power in Title II to regulate moving sources of emissions.24 Finally, 
the EPA can institute a permitting program for major stationary 
sources of carbon dioxide emissions under Title V.25 This Article 
considers these three Titles together because the strongest case for 
the EPA’s ability to curb climate change can be made if the EPA 
attempts to use all three of these regulatory devices together at once. 
Regulating carbon dioxide emissions under Titles I, II, and V 
has several advantages. First, the EPA can institute new regulations 
without having to go through Congress. Instead, the EPA would 
have to submit new rules in the Federal Register and follow the 
proper rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.26 Rulemaking is typically a faster and more efficient method of 
policymaking than trying to pass a law through Congress, but an 
agency must only enact rules within the powers granted to it through 
particular legislation.27 As such, it would be quicker to promulgate 
new regulations under the Clean Air Act than it would be for 
                                                                                                             
 23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7409 (2006). 
 24. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (requiring the EPA Administrator to, 
“by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the 
provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant 
from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, 
which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”). The EPA has recently 
proposed a rule to do precisely this. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600) [hereinafter 
Light-Duty Vehicle Emission Standards].  
 25. See, e.g., Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse 
Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule]. 
 26. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501–706 (2006). 
 27. Congress must provide, at a minimum, an intelligible principle with which 
an agency must adhere. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 
409 (1928) (“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle 
to which the person or body authorized to [administer a statutory scheme] is 
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of 
legislative power.”). 
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Congress to pass a cap-and-trade or carbon tax bill, but such 
regulations would probably not be as powerful or as effective as 
laws enacted by Congress.  
Another advantage of regulating carbon dioxide under the Clean 
Air Act is that much of the implementation and regulation would be 
left to the states.28 Under the Clean Air Act, states are left to develop 
State Implementation Plans that best adhere to the Act’s pollution 
reduction goals, as long as such plans meet or exceed the minimum 
levels required by statute.29 The EPA would most likely develop a 
one-size-fits-all plan for all industries and regions of the United 
States. Individual states, on the other hand, could set different goals 
and timelines depending on their unique access to alternative energy 
sources, respective industries, and so on. This approach seems more 
efficient than a federal one-size-fits-all mandate on carbon emission 
reductions, and it would be less stifling to industry. 
However, there are several drawbacks to relying on the Clean 
Air Act to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. First of all, though 
rulemaking is usually more expedient than passing legislation 
through Congress, rules can still be challenged and delayed. For 
instance, Texas, along with several co-plaintiffs, challenged the 
recently promulgated EPA rule limiting light-duty vehicle 
greenhouse gas emissions.30 Likewise, the Sierra Club and six states 
recently challenged the “tailoring rule”31 that the EPA promulgated 
under Title V, which treats major stationary sources of carbon 
dioxide differently than smaller sources.32 
Second, even when the EPA enacts rules that survive such 
challenges, these rules still require an extended period of time to 
have their intended effects. For instance, the challenged EPA rule 
for vehicle greenhouse gas emissions survived litigation and took 
effect in January 2011, but its restrictions will not be fully instituted 
until 2016.33 Even then, the rule will only apply to new vehicles, so 
there will still be millions of cars on the roads that fall short of the 
35.5 miles per gallon minimum imposed by the rule.  
                                                                                                             
 28. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 684 F.3d 102 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 31. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 26. 
 32. See Robin Bravender, Sierra Club, States File Challenges to EPA's 
'Tailoring' Rule for Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. Times (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www 
.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/03/03greenwire-sierra-club-states-file-challenges-to-
epas-tai-24900.html.  
 33. The rule covers vehicles produced between 2012 and 2016. See Light-
Duty Vehicle Emission Standards, supra note 25. 
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Another drawback is the uncertainty about how much carbon 
dioxide emission reduction these regulations can accomplish, even 
collectively. For example, transportation emissions account for 
about 28% of all carbon dioxide emissions in the United States.34 As 
previously discussed, the EPA’s rule to raise the minimum fuel 
efficiency standard to 35.5 miles per gallon does not apply 
retroactively and will not take effect until 2016.35 Rules such as 
these do not go far enough in a short enough timeframe to 
effectively curb carbon dioxide emissions and slow down or stop 
climate change. 
Similarly, since the EPA can only enact rules within its specified 
powers under the Clean Air Act, it probably cannot promulgate rules 
stringent enough to reduce carbon dioxide emissions sufficiently to 
curb climate change. The Clean Air Act’s purpose is to lower the 
concentrations of pollutants in the air. Carbon dioxide is not 
classified a pollutant in the same vein as lead or sulfur dioxide.36 As 
such, enacting a NAAQS and then testing for carbon dioxide will do 
no good because it is not the mere presence of carbon dioxide in the 
air that is dangerous. Instead, it is the volume of carbon dioxide 
emissions that cause icebergs to melt, sea levels to rise, and a variety 
of similar effects that are dangerous to the public—not the presence 
of carbon dioxide gas in the atmosphere itself.37 
Finally, one of the supposed strengths of regulating under the 
Clean Air Act—state implementation—might actually be a 
weakness. Individual states do not have the funding or resources to 
adequately address an international problem like climate change. 
Regulations under the Clean Air Act would permit greater overall 
carbon dioxide emission reductions than piecemeal reductions by 
the few states currently concerned about reducing emissions.38 
                                                                                                             
 34. Transportation’s Role in Climate Change, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
http://climate.dot.gov/about/transportations-role/overview.html (last visited Oct. 9, 
2013).  
 35. See Light-Duty Vehicle Emission Standards, supra note 25. 
 36. Carbon dioxide is not harmful in the same immediately perceivable way 
that pollutants, which are harmful to human health, are. Instead, carbon dioxide’s 
harm is indirect—greenhouse gases cause sea levels to rise, which threaten coastal 
states, such as Massachusetts. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 
499 (2007) (“According to petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits, global sea levels 
rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of 
global warming.”). Further, the U.S. Supreme Court found that carbon dioxide is a 
pollutant under the meaning of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 500 (“[G]reenhouse gases 
fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant.’”). 
 37. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 500. 
 38. As expected, coastal states such as Massachusetts, are the most worried 
about reducing emissions because of their susceptibility to a rise in sea level 
caused by climate change. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497. 
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Furthermore, several states failed to meet the deadlines imposed by 
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.39 States may be unlikely to 
meet future deadlines to reduce carbon dioxide emissions under the 
Clean Air Act.  
Even if the EPA enacted rules to limit carbon dioxide emissions 
through all of the methods discussed above, these rules would not 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions enough to effectively curb climate 
change. Instead, a cap-and-trade scheme or a carbon tax would more 
effectively address climate change in both the short and long runs. 
The EPA has moved forward with rules to regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions under the Clean Air Act, but only time will tell how 
effective these regulations will be.40 Nevertheless, the EPA’s ability 
to promulgate regulations, and its past successes doing so, makes 
regulatory controls under the Clean Air Act an option that deserves a 
hard look.41  
III. CAP-AND-TRADE 
Cap-and-trade schemes for carbon emissions can take several 
forms, but they all include capping the total amount of emissions 
allowed and allotting carbon credits to polluting companies.42 Cap-
and-trade schemes share several advantages. One such advantage is 
the economic incentive to reduce carbon emissions, while another is 
an overall cap on carbon dioxide emissions that a government can 
                                                                                                             
 39. John N. Cushman Jr., States and Government Lag in Meeting Clean Air 
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/16/us/states-
and-government-lag-in-meeting-clean-air-law.html (“Three years after Congress 
rewrote the Clean Air Act, the Federal Government and the states are consistently 
behind on many of the law's demanding timetables, including a deadline for filing 
smog-reduction plans that was missed today by about half the states.”); see also 
Evan Weinberger, EPA Missed Western Clean Air Act Deadlines: CBD, LAW360 
(Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/165338/epa-missed-western-
clean-air-act-deadlines-cbd (“The group said in its letter that it had uncovered the 
EPA's alleged failures under the Clean Air Act after reviewing where the agency 
had and had not complied with the statute since Congress made the amendments in 
1990.”).  
 40. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 684 F.3d 
102, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (finding that the EPA’s actions to regulate greenhouse 
gases were based on the clear intent of Congress under the Clean Air Act).  
 41. See Highlights from the Clean Air Act 40th Anniversary Celebration, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/40th_highlights.html (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2013) (highlighting of the successes of the Clean Air Act during its 
first forty years). 
 42. Allowance Trading Basics, U.S ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www 
.epa.gov/airmarkets/trading/basics.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (“Cap and trade 
programs use emission allowances as the currency to comply with emission 
reduction requirements.”).  
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lower based on how many reductions it wants to make.43 The 
primary economic incentive under a cap-and-trade scheme is that 
companies are able to sell leftover carbon credits.44 The “cap” in 
cap-and-trade is a powerful regulatory tool because it allows a 
government to be certain that it is reducing its carbon emissions by a 
certain amount.45 A carbon tax, on the other hand, would not ensure 
a reduction in carbon emissions by itself; as companies and 
consumers could continue to produce and consume at pre-carbon tax 
levels by paying more.46 
Implementing a cap-and-trade system is arguably the most 
popular of the available methods for reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions. Cap-and-trade was originally a Republican-backed 
answer to climate change and emissions reductions.47 Lately, it has 
fallen out of favor with both the GOP and some Democrats.48 
Regardless, one of the few issues that Senators McCain and Obama 
agreed on during the 2008 election was the need for a cap-and-trade 
                                                                                                             
 43. In order to make any actual progress, the cap would need to be lowered 
over time. CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, CAP AND TRADE 101, at 1 (Jan. 
2008), http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2008/01/pdf 
/capandtrade101.pdf (“To achieve this goal [of limiting the rise in global 
temperature to approximately 2.0 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by 
2050], the U.S. government should steadily tighten the cap until emissions are 
reduced to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.”). 
 44. The economic incentive comes from being able to sell unused credits to 
other polluters, environmentalists, non-profits, or other interested parties, who then 
hold these credits so that they are not used and therefore less pollution occurs. 
Buying Allowances, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets 
/trading/buying.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (“Under both the Acid Rain 
Program and the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), anyone can purchase 
allowances, including both regulated companies and members of the general 
public. Some individuals and groups purchase allowances as an environmental 
statement, because withholding allowances from the market prevents those 
allowances from being used by regulated sources to cover emissions.”). 
 45. See CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, supra note 44, at 1. 
 46. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 46–47 (explaining that this 
uncertainty surrounding a reduction of carbon dioxide emissions as a result of a 
carbon tax as the “benefit uncertainty” aspect of such a tax).  
 47. Daniel J. Weiss, The GOP Changes its Tune on Cap-and-Trade, GRIST 
(Oct. 23, 2010, 3:12 AM) http://www.grist.org/article/2010-10-22-gop-changes-
tune-on-cap-and-trade-reagan. 
 48. See id. (explaining that the Republican Party promised to oppose attempts 
to impose a national cap-and-trade energy tax in its 2010 “Pledge to America”); 
Alexander Mooney, Manchin Actually Puts a Bullet Through Cap and Trade Bill, 
CNN (Oct. 11, 2010, 11:56 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/10/11 
/manchin-actually-puts-a-bullet-through-cap-and-trade-bill/ (stating that Senator-
elect Joe Manchin (D) of West Virginia “shot the cap-and-trade bill with a rifle” in 
a 2010 campaign advertisement). 
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emission-trading scheme to combat climate change.49 They 
disagreed, however, on how the credits should be allotted to 
polluters.50 McCain favored allotting credits to currently polluting 
companies for free at the allocation date.51 Obama, on the other 
hand, championed a cap-and-trade system that auctioned off carbon 
credits to companies rather than giving them away for free.52 
These types of cap-and-trade schemes share some of the same 
general criticisms. For instance, critics point out that even if the U.S. 
adopts a cap-and-trade scheme, the fact that China and India have 
not may cause U.S. companies to move to those countries, which 
would hurt the U.S. economy and cost the U.S. jobs.53 Also, the 
U.S. would not net the intended benefit of instituting a cap-and-trade 
program if the polluting companies move to another country and 
continue to pollute at their current levels.54 Fears of this sort were 
among the reasons the U.S. signed the Kyoto Protocol but did not 
ratify it.55  
Critics of cap-and-trade argue that the idea of a cap does not 
conform to the tenets of capitalism.56 Specifically, critics argue that, 
in a capitalist system, the market and overall production should be 
                                                                                                             
 49. See Dan Shapley, Green Election Issues 101: Global Warming, The Daily 
Green (Aug. 26, 2008, 5:15 AM), http://www.thedailygreen.com/environmental-
news/latest/global-warming-47082511. But see John M. Broder, Both Romney and 
Obama Avoid Talk of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2012, at A18 
(pointing out that “neither [President Obama] nor Mr. Romney has laid out during 
the campaign a legislative or regulatory program to address the fundamental 
questions arising from one of the most vexing economic, environmental, political 
and humanitarian issues to face the planet.”).  
 50. Shapley, supra note 50. 
 51. Id. (“[McCain] would allot credits to existing polluters, rather than 
auctioning them off.”).  
 52. Id. 
 53. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to 
Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 357 (2008) (arguing that 
this problem could be overcome by requiring importers of highly carbon-intensive 
goods from countries that have not taken climate policy actions comparable to the 
United States to hold appropriate quantities of carbon credits); but see Idiots, 
CLIMATE WONK (Oct. 20, 2010), http://thecarboneconomist.wordpress.com/2010 
/10/20/idiots/ (explaining that a study found that China already has a substantial 
implicit price on carbon without a formal carbon trading scheme or tax in place). 
 54. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 47 (discussing this as 
another form of benefit uncertainty that is possible under a carbon tax scheme).  
 55. SUSAN R. FLETCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30692, GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 12 (2005) (discussing that the U.S. 
signed the Kyoto Protocol on November 12, 1998, but President Clinton did not 
submit the Protocol to Senate; in 2001, President Bush rejected the Protocol).  
 56. See generally William O’Keefe, A Bad Bill For Cap-And-Trade, FORBES 
(June 8, 2009, 1:53 PM) http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/08/waxman-markey-bill-
carbon-emission-opinions-contributors-cap-and-trade.html. 
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ever increasing, which means a cap, as a regulatory tool, is ill-suited 
to allow production and gross domestic product values to increase. 
Likewise, it could be argued that lowering the cap in order to reduce 
overall carbon emissions also is anti-capitalistic.57 The obvious 
response to this criticism is that the market could still grow while we 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions as long as better, cleaner 
technologies are developed. 
The two primary types of cap-and-trade are different enough 
from each other that they are worth discussing individually. In order 
to keep these two cap-and-trade schemes distinct, the pros and cons 
of each will be discussed in the following subsections. 
A. Free Allocation of Carbon Credits 
Cap-and-trade schemes that allocate carbon credits to 
corporations for free generally benefit those corporations first and 
foremost. For instance, corporations can continue to pollute at the 
levels they had prior to the cap-and-trade but will benefit monetarily 
if they reduce their emissions and sell their leftover credits.58 Of 
course, in order to combat climate change, the cap must eventually 
be lowered.59 However, companies would have time to adapt to this 
lower cap and could buy leftover credits from other companies if 
they failed to lower their emissions in time for the cap reduction. 
These are the two primary benefits of this pollution allocation 
scheme: first, companies have an economic incentive to pollute less, 
and second, the government could reduce the cap, at will, to bring 
about carbon emissions reductions at a swifter pace. 
Another advantage this method of cap-and-trade has over other 
methods of carbon emissions reductions is that it would not stifle 
industry and production as much as the alternatives.60 Free 
allocation schemes allow time for companies and industries that are 
behind the curve to develop the technology to reduce their carbon 
emissions instead of forcing them to start paying for emission 
                                                                                                             
 57. In a capitalist system, the goal is a growing economy, which is usually 
accomplished via increased production and increased outputs. A “cap” necessarily 
goes against these capitalist tenets.  
 58. For example, assume a company is allotted credits for 1,000 units of 
carbon dioxide emissions. If the company keeps emitting at this level, it does not 
gain (nor does it lose) anything. If it lowers its emissions to 900 units by installing 
emissions reducing technology, it would then be able to sell its excess 100 credits 
to another emitter, perhaps one just entering the marketplace.  
 59. In order to reduce the total emissions in order to slow climate change, the 
cap on emissions must be lowered.  
 60. Whether technology-forcing regulations actually stifles industry, and to 
what extent, is a contentious topic. See Jackson, infra note 63.  
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credits or levying taxes against them under a carbon tax scheme.61 
This is a very strong argument for this form of cap-and-trade, but the 
argument could just as easily be made that companies are not 
willing to innovate just to improve the environment, and therefore, it 
is up to the government to push them along.62 
Despite its benefits, there are several drawbacks to a cap-and-
trade scheme that allocates credits at no cost to polluting companies. 
Giving away pollution credits punishes those companies that reduce 
their emissions prior to the allocation of these credits because these 
companies are allotted fewer credits than if they had not reduced 
their emissions.63 Likewise, the mere possibility that this form of 
cap-and-trade could be implemented may be currently deterring 
emission reductions because it benefits companies to adopt a “wait-
and-see” approach to lowering emissions. While this sort of cap-
and-trade scheme is still on the table, companies might find it 
beneficial to continue their current levels of emissions.  
Another criticism of the free allocation of carbon credits is that 
allocating credits is an inexact science.64 Previous credit trading 
markets have over-allocated credits, which led to market crashes. 
                                                                                                             
 61. Cap-and-trade would be less stifling because it would allow for a settling 
in period and predictability, and current polluters could be allowed to pollute at 
their current levels before the cap is eventually lowered. CENTER FOR AMERICAN 
PROGRESS, supra note 44, at 1 (“The federal government can also choose to 
‘grandfather’ allowances to the polluting firms by handing them out free based on 
historic or projected emissions. This would give the most benefits to those 
companies with higher baseline emissions that have historically done the least to 
reduce their pollution.”).  
 62. E.g., Lisa P. Jackson, The Clean Air Act by the Numbers, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2010, 11:49 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/lisa-p-jackson/the-clean-air-act-by-the-_b_731564.html (noting that when 
the Clean Air Act was first enacted, lobbyists claimed that “entire industries 
[would] collapse” if catalytic converters were required for new cars and trucks, but 
instead, the Act essentially “gave birth to a global market for catalytic converters 
and enthroned American manufacturers at the pinnacle of that market.”).  
 63. Giving away pollution credits might even incentivize emitting more 
carbon dioxide during the year that establishes the benchmark for allocating 
credits to polluters. This problem seems like it could be mitigated to some extent 
by taking an average of the past several years rather than basing the benchmark on 
any one year.  
 64. For example, the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme initially 
failed because it over-allocated credits. OPEN EUROPE, EUROPE’S DIRTY SECRET: 
WHY THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME ISN’T WORKING 5 (Aug. 2007), 
http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/etsp2.pdf (“Huge over-
allocation of permits to pollute led to a collapse in the price of carbon from €33 to 
just €0.20 per tonne, meaning that the system did not reduce emissions at all.”). 
2013] CLIMATE CHANGE: CARBON TAX? 61 
 
 
 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS)65 is an 
example of a scheme in which over-allocation of carbon credits had 
a disastrous effect on the market. The EU-ETS is the largest carbon 
emissions trading market in the world and one of the first of its 
kind.66 When the EU-ETS market first allocated credits in 2005, 
European governments overestimated the amount of permits that 
should be issued.67 The result of this over-allocation was a collapse 
of the market, with carbon credits plummeting from €33 per unit to 
€0.20 within the year.68 The possibility of similar market crashes 
makes other cap-and-trade scheme types or a carbon tax that much 
more attractive.  
In the United States, a recent over-allocation of credits in the 
Acid-Rain Program69 has yielded similar results to those 
experienced by the European Union. The Acid-Rain Program is a 
sulfur dioxide trading program that the EPA instituted as part of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.70 Despite reducing sulfur 
dioxide emissions by half since 1995, the acid-rain trading market 
eventually collapsed.71 This collapse highlighted why using market-
based tools to address environmental protection concerns can have 
unintended consequences.72 Because of the collapse, companies now 
have a financial incentive to emit more sulfur dioxide into the air in 
                                                                                                             
 65. See generally The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last updated 
July 1, 2013). 
 66. Id. 
 67. OPEN EUROPE, supra note 66, at 5. 
 68. Id.  
 69. See Acid Rain Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov 
/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/index.html (last updated July 25, 2012).  
 70. See DAVID M. BEARDEN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30798, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS: SUMMARIES OF MAJOR STATUTES ADMINISTERED BY THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 3 (2010) (“Changes to the [Clean Air 
Act] in 1990 included provisions to…establish an acid rain control program, with 
a marketable allowance scheme to provide flexibility in implementation . . .”).  
 71. Mark Peters, Changes Choke Cap-and-Trade Market, WALL ST. J. (July 
12, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870425860457536082 
1005676554.html.  
 72. The crash resulted after a federal appeals court tossed out the EPA’s 
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) in 2008, and the resulting unintended 
consequences stemmed from polluters polluting as much as they can before the 
EPA introduced a replacement Rule. Gabriel Nelson, Uneasy Emission Traders 
Seek Help From Congress on CAIR Replacement, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/07/12/12greenwire-uneasy-emission-traders-
seek-help-from-congres-53513.html?pagewanted=all (explaining that “pollution is 
likely to spike in the short run as utilities prepare for the final version of the 
proposed rule [designed to replace CAIR] to take effect.”).  
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order to drive the value of their sulfur credits back up again.73 
Companies now have no incentive to avoid emissions or to hold 
credits for the future, because the credits are almost worthless.74  
Over-allocation of credits has, to a large extent, been the result 
of companies lobbying for credits they do not need. For example, in 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, companies 
projected inflated carbon emissions in order to acquire more 
credits.75 These inflated projections result in the companies with the 
best lobbyists “winning” the most carbon credits.76 This system also 
paid polluters to not pollute despite the fact that they were already 
limiting their pollution because of other environmental laws and not 
because of the cap-and-trade system.77 This unintended and 
unattractive result highlights this particular cap-and-trade scheme’s 
primary weakness compared to the scheme that auctions off credits. 
Under a cap-and-trade system that gives away credits, companies do 
not have an explicit monetary incentive for which to aim to reduce 
their emissions outlook. Lowering their emission outlook would 
reduce the number of credits these companies are given in this 
scheme. 
Another criticism of this form of cap-and-trade is that it is 
susceptible to fraud, corruption, and scams.78 One type of scam 
involves the clean-up of “exotic” greenhouse gases under the Kyoto 
Protocol.79 One such greenhouse gas is HFC-23.80 This gas is 
extremely potent, with one ton of HFC-23 being as potent as 11,700 
tons of carbon dioxide.81 Companies that reduce the emission of this 
gas receive tens of thousands of carbon credits for doing so, but 
simply installing a scrubber for a few million dollars can reduce 
these emissions.82 The result is another financial windfall, with 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. (“Existing allowances of SO2 traded at about $5 per ton last week, 
down from about $15 per ton before the release of the transport rule. They had 
hovered around $300 per ton before CAIR's rejection in 2008.”). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Kevin Smith, Stern Words While in the EU They’re Trading Hot Air, 
PARLIMENTARY BRIEFING 25–26 (Dec. 2006), http://www.carbontradewatch.org 
/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=36. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. (noting that “[t]he fact that their emissions were already controlled 
under other environmental regulations led Edward Leigh, the Conservative chair 
of the Public Accounts Committee, to observe that the scheme ‘seems to be paying 
[the four companies] £11 million for keeping emissions down to levels they had 
already achieved before they joined.’”). 
 78. See generally OPEN EUROPE, supra note 66. 
 79. OPEN EUROPE, supra note 66, at 7. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
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participants in the clean-up of this exotic gas getting the benefit of 
some €4.6 billion for processes that cost only about €100 million to 
carry out.83 If the U.S. institutes a cap-and-trade scheme like the 
EU-ETS, it should minimize loopholes such as this one.  
The likelihood of passing this kind of cap-and-trade bill through 
Congress seems to be fading with every passing election. Even 
Senator John McCain, who ran for President in 2008 on a platform 
calling for cap-and-trade and who co-sponsored a cap-and-trade bill 
back in 2003, called cap-and-trade legislation “cap-and-tax” and 
eventually argued against its implementation.84 Likewise, despite 
being an early champion of cap-and-trade, the GOP has essentially 
abandoned the concept.85 The reasons for this change are subject to 
debate, but it is worth pointing out that former President George 
H.W. Bush, a Republican, signed the first successful cap-and-trade 
legislation in the U.S. and that, until recently, Republicans Sarah 
Palin and Newt Gingrich supported cap-and-trade.86 Likewise, 
several Republicans who now staunchly oppose cap-and-trade in 
any form voted for the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which 
included the acid-rain trading cap-and-trade program.87 This change 
of heart seems to be the result of heavy lobbying by the oil and gas 
industries88 and the emergence of Tea Party Republicans.89 Tea 
                                                                                                             
 83. Id. at 8.  
 84. Andrew Schenkel, Cap-and-Trade is the Latest Twist in John McCain's 
Quest for Re-Election, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Aug. 24, 2010, 12:24 PM), 
http://www.mnn.com/earth-matters/politics/stories/cap-and-trade-is-the-latest-
twist-in-john-mccains-quest-for-re-electi. 
 85. Daniel J. Weiss, The GOP Changes its Tune on Cap and Trade, CENTER 
FOR AMERICAN PRESS (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues 
/green/news/2010/10/22/8499/the-gop-changes-its-tune-on-cap-and-trade/. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. (counting among the staunch conservatives that voted for the Clear Air 
Act the following Senators: Kit Bond (R-Mo.), Trent Lott (R-Miss.), Mitch 
McConnell (R-Ky.), and Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.). Conservative House 
supporters included Reps. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), Joe Barton (R-Tex.), Dennis 
Hastert (R-Ill.), Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), and Fred Upton (R-Mich.)).  
 88. Matt Gertz, FoxPAC: Gingrich Attacks Cap and Trade on Fox While His 
Political Committee Takes Fossil Fuel Money, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA 
(Apr. 19, 2010, 11:21 AM), http://mediamatters.org/research/201004190019 
(noting that Newt Gingrich’s political action committee received $350,000 from a 
major coal-producing company in the first quarter of 2010 alone). 
 89. Brad Plumer, How the Tea Party Changed the Climate Debate, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 7, 2011, 1:12 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog 
/post/how-the-tea-party-changed-the-climate-debate/2011/09/07/gIQAVMMh9J 
_blog.html (“Self-identified Tea Party types make up just 12 percent of the 
country, but they tend to be the fiercest global-warming deniers: ‘Majorities of 
Democrats (78%), Independents (71%) and Republicans (53%) believe that global 
warming is happening. By contrast, only 34 percent of Tea Party members believe 
global warming is happening, while 53 percent say it is not happening.’”).  
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Party candidates, who seem to be setting the GOP’s agenda after the 
party’s major losses in 2006 and 2008, have repeatedly denied the 
existence of climate change.90 One New York Times columnist 
argues that the Tea Party mindset “aligns with [that] of the fossil 
fuel industries, which have for decades waged a concerted campaign 
to raise doubts about the science of global warming and to 
undermine policies devised to address it.”91 As such, this form of 
cap-and-trade may be the least likely of the possible methods of 
emission reductions to be implemented.92 
B. Auctioning Carbon Credits 
The other popular option for cap-and-trade involves auctioning 
carbon credits rather than simply allocating credits to carbon-
emitting businesses for free.93 By auctioning off credits, companies 
would hopefully pay the government larger amounts for the ability 
to continue emitting harmful greenhouse gases.94 There are several 
advantages to such a scheme. On its face, this scheme seems to be a 
fairer way to apportion harmful carbon dioxide emissions between 
competing companies because a company must pay in proportion to 
how much they pollute.95 
A major advantage to this scheme is that it generates revenue 
that the government can use to both fund research and subsidize 
                                                                                                             
 90. See John M. Broder, Climate Change Doubt is Tea Party Article of Faith, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at A1. 
 91. Id.  
 92. However, tea party support is beginning to wane. Lydia Saad, Tea Party 
Support Dwindles to Near-Record Low, GALLUP (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www 
.gallup.com/poll/164648/tea-party-support-dwindles-near-record-low.aspx 
(“Fewer Americans now describe themselves as supporters of the Tea Party 
movement than did at the height of the movement in 2010, or even at the start of 
2012. Today's 22% support nearly matches the record low found two years ago.”).  
 93. FAQs Cap and Trade, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa 
.gov/captrade/faqs.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2013) (explaining the difference 
between an auction-based cap system and an allocation-based system: “In an 
auction system, the government must design an auction and allocate the proceeds. 
In an allocation system the government must decide who receives allowances and 
how many they receive. The process of determining which cap and trade system to 
use is not a substantial factor in a program’s success. It is an important step, but 
one that does not affect the ability of a program to promote human health and 
environmental benefits. It is the emission cap and banking that determine the 
amount of reductions a program can achieve.”).  
 94. This scheme is essentially a type of “polluter pays” system. See, e.g., 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, at 
Principle 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) 
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm. 
 95. Id. 
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alternative energy sources.96 Auctioning carbon credits at the outset 
has some of the same benefits as a carbon tax. For instance, 
auctioning credits raises government revenue and directly impacts 
the largest polluters because they end up paying the most to pollute. 
Auctioning credits also provides an economic incentive to limit 
carbon-dioxide emissions.97 Auctioning credits avoids the main 
pitfall of allotting free carbon credits by ensuring that the number of 
credits auctioned off matches the needs of the bidding companies.98 
A well-planned carbon auction should result in market equilibrium 
that would reduce the risk of market crashes compared to the other 
type of cap-and-trade.99  
Auctioning credits also would not penalize corporations that 
may have already attempted to reduce emissions before the 
allocation of credits Instead, these environmentally responsible 
corporations would pay less for carbon credits, because they would 
need to buy fewer of them, than competitor corporations that have 
not yet reduced emissions. 
In the United States, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI),100 which began operating in 2009,101 is an example of this 
kind of cap-and-trade scheme.102 Early indications seem to suggest 
that the program is working as planned.103 Likewise, the European 
                                                                                                             
 96. For example, President Obama’s 2010 Budget proposed using monies 
collected from payments for greenhouse gas emissions to fund clean technologies. 
Kevin Eber, President’s Budget Draws Clean Energy Funds from Climate 
Measure, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.renewable 
energyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/03/presidents-budget-draws-clean-energy-
funds-from-climate-measure?cmpid=WNL-Friday-March6-2009 (“The president's 
proposed budget directs $15 billion per year of those funds toward clean energy 
technologies, while directing the remaining funds toward a tax cut.”).  
 97. If a polluter reduces its emissions, it reduces the number of credits it needs 
to operate. A carbon tax also features this incentive for companies that reduce their 
emissions. FAQs Cap and Trade, supra note 95 (“Cap and trade programs and 
tax-based programs are similar in that they are market-based and create a price for 
emissions. It is this price that creates a financial incentive to reduce emissions.”).  
 98. A company is not going to pay for credits it does not need, but a company 
would accept extra free credits, especially if it could then sell those credits.  
 99. For instance, a free market emissions trading scheme could avoid a 
collapse like the one suffered by the acid rain program. See Peters, supra note 73. 
 100. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/home (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2013).  
 101. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, OVERVIEW OF RGGI CO2 
BUDGET TRADING PROGRAM (Oct. 2007) available at http://www.rggi.org/docs 
/program_summary_10_07.pdf. 
 102. Id. at 4 (“Under RGGI, instead of giving allowances directly to electric 
generators for free, states would sell a significant portion or all allowances through 
a regional auction or otherwise.”).  
 103. John Dillon, Regional Greenhouse Gas Effort Eyed As National Model, 
VERMONT PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 25, 2013), http://digital.vpr.net/post/regional-
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Union Emissions Trading Scheme moved from free allocation of 
credits to an auction model in 2013.104  
Auctioning credits also avoids many of the possible scams and 
lobbying problems of a system that gives away credits. The reason is 
simple—if a company has to pay for its carbon credits at an auction, 
that company does not have a motive to obtain more credits than it 
needs.  
An auction scheme also avoids the possible takings inherent in 
giving corporations quantifiable rights to freely pollute and then 
reducing the limit on those pollution rights in the future. Instead, 
these companies would have to buy carbon credits each year. This 
scheme would allow the government the ability to reduce the overall 
number of credits issued but still allow companies to buy the same 
number of credits each year. Companies may have to pay more for 
credits if they do not reduce their emissions in line with the lowered 
overall cap. This system incentivizes carbon emission reductions but 
allows companies behind the curve time to catch up or else pay 
more to remain large polluters.  
A popular criticism of an auction system is that such a system is 
really just a carbon tax in disguise.105 Even President Obama has 
admitted that this kind of carbon auctioning cap-and-trade scheme 
works like a carbon tax.106 The obvious counterargument to such a 
criticism is that auctioning credits is not a tax, but instead a device 
that seeks to account for the externalities associated with carbon 
emissions and then lower those externalities over time.107 Likewise, 
a credit auction is not a tax because it is a market-based approach to 
lowering carbon emissions. If a company reduces its emissions, it 
will pay less as a result. The higher-polluting companies will need to 
                                                                                                             
 
greenhouse-gas-effort-eyed-national-model (explaining that the RGGI has 
exceeded expectations and is being hailed as a possible model for a nationwide 
cap-and-trade scheme). However, the RGGI has made several amendments to its 
initial agreement. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE , SUMMARY OF 
RGGI MODEL RULE CHANGES (Feb. 2013) available at http://www.rggi.org/docs 
/ProgramReview/_FinalProgramReviewMaterials/Model_Rule_Summary.pdf. 
 104. The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2013) 
(“Auctioning, not free allocation, is now the default method for allocating 
allowances. In 2013 more than 40% of allowances will be auctioned, and this 
share will rise progressively each year”).  
 105. See, e.g., Sarah Palin, Op-Ed., The ‘Cap and Tax’ Dead End, WASH. POST 
(July 14, 2009), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-07-14/opinions/36927 
469_1_energy-sector-energy-policy-economic-growth-and-energy. 
 106. N. Gregory Mankiw, Op-Ed, A Missed Opportunity on Climate Change, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at BU4. 
 107. See infra note 126 for a more in-depth discussion of externalities.  
2013] CLIMATE CHANGE: CARBON TAX? 67 
 
 
 
spend more to make sure they secure carbon credits to meet their 
production needs. By reducing their emissions, companies can wait 
and bid less. Also, if all companies reduce their emissions more 
quickly than the government lowers the cap, all bidding companies 
win because they all end up paying less per credit. Under a carbon 
tax scheme, companies would still pay the same per ton of carbon 
emissions whether or not all the other companies were emitting less.  
This sort of cap-and-trade scheme has lost a lot of steam since 
President Obama first declared it a priority during his 2008 
campaign.108 Instead of focusing on carbon emissions, Obama spent 
the first year of his term, and most of his political capital, passing an 
intensely controversial health care bill.109 Consequently, it now 
seems like this form of cap-and-trade is obsolete.110 Further, 
President Obama is not likely to risk his remaining political capital 
supporting a cap-and-trade scheme in the near future due to its 
waning popularity.  
IV. CARBON TAX 
A third method of reducing carbon dioxide emissions is to tax 
the amount of carbon dioxide that companies emit into the 
atmosphere. Like a cap-and-trade scheme, this tax could be applied 
either upstream or downstream.111 An upstream tax would be 
applied to fossil fuel production whereas a downstream tax would be 
applied to emitters of greenhouse gases.112 Former Secretary of 
Labor Robert Reich described a carbon tax as “a tax on all fossil-
based fuels that reflects their true social, political, and 
environmental costs.”113 This “true cost” of fossil fuels has 
alternately been called the “social cost of carbon.”114 A carbon tax is 
not a new idea. It is currently implemented in British Columbia 
                                                                                                             
 108. Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, at 70, 72 
(“‘Energy we have to deal with today,’ Obama said in a debate with McCain 
[during his Presidential campaign]. ‘Health care is priority No. 2.’”). 
 109. Id. at 83.  
 110. See id. (arguing that even Obama is no longer willing to fight for climate 
change regulation and has moved from healthcare reform to the relatively safe 
topic of securities regulation reform).  
 111. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 31. This Article assumes 
for simplicity’s sake that a carbon tax instituted in the U.S. would be “upstream” 
because the leading carbon tax proposals have been “upstream” taxes. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Robert B. Reich, Inherit the Windfall, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 7, 2007), 
http://prospect.org/article/inherit-windfall.  
 114. See generally David Pearce, The Social Cost of Carbon and its Policy 
Implications, 19 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 362 (2003), http://www 
.climateactionproject.com/docs/SOCIAL_COST_OF_CARBON.pdf.  
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Canada,115 as well as in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.116 
A carbon tax is an attempt to account for the harmful effects of 
carbon dioxide emissions.117 In a perfect market, the amount taxed 
would equal the social cost of carbon.118  
Perhaps the biggest benefit of a carbon tax is its simplicity. A 
carbon tax can be applied to producers of fossil fuels and electricity 
at a standard rate based on the tons of carbon they emit each year. At 
the end of the year, the tax rate could be raised or lowered 
depending on whether the carbon tax achieved the desired decrease 
in carbon emissions. It is easier for a company to plan for a carbon 
tax in its yearly operating budget than it would be for a company to 
plan for the market price of a ton of carbon dioxide under the credit 
auction form of cap-and-trade.119  
Another advantage of a carbon tax is that it would produce 
revenue for the federal government, which could then be used to 
subsidize renewable energy projects. Alternatively, the government 
could return these funds to the companies that had the lowest carbon 
emission reductions for that year, thus providing another incentive 
to produce fewer emissions.  
Likewise, a carbon tax would provide the clearest incentive to 
companies to reduce emissions. Board members could tell 
shareholders that every ton of carbon emissions that they reduce 
would save the company a defined amount of money. In contrast, 
                                                                                                             
 115. See Stewart Elgie, et al., Op-Ed., B.C.’s Carbon Tax is Looking like a 
Winner, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 27, 2010, at A11, available at http://www2 
.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/archives/story.html?id=ed4d2b45-480b-4fc2-8c13-
52dd1ab5a15a&p=2. 
 116. Monica Prasad, Op-Ed., On Carbon, Tax and Don’t Spend, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 25, 2008, at A27.  
 117. A harm, which the market does not account for, is known as an 
“externality.” Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 30 (explaining that 
“[f]rom an economic standpoint, however, carbon dioxide emissions are the 
classic externality: emissions occur at no cost to the emitting facility, but at an 
enormous cost to society as a whole.”). See generally Dieter Helm, Economic 
Instruments and Environmental Policy, 36 ECON. & SOC. REV. 205 (2005) 
(explaining that the classic solution to environmental externalities is imposing a 
tax equal to the marginal social cost of the externality).  
 118. G.W. YOHE, ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND 
VULNERABILITY, ch. 20, at 823 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007) (“According to 
economic theory, if the social cost calculations were complete and markets were 
perfect, then efforts to cut back the emissions of greenhouse gases would continue 
as long as the marginal cost of the cutbacks were lower than the social cost of the 
impacts they cause. If taxes were used, then they should be set equal to the [social 
cost of carbon].”).  
 119. See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 42 (discussing this 
advantage of carbon taxes as “cost certainty”). 
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cap-and-trade schemes cause companies to spend fluctuating sums 
of money on carbon credits, and companies can game the system.120 
A carbon tax scheme is also less prone to lobbying, fraud, and 
corruption than a cap-and-trade scheme would be.121 Under a carbon 
tax scheme, all carbon-emitting companies must pay taxes based on 
a set, yearly, carbon tax rate. There is no incentive to pollute more 
initially, as there would be under the Free Allocation form of cap-
and-trade discussed. Instead, companies would have an incentive to 
emit less, so they pay less in taxes.  
Current carbon tax schemes in other countries reveal possible 
pros and cons of imposing a carbon tax here in the United States. 
For example, a Norwegian carbon tax has not led to a reduction in 
carbon emissions.122 Instead, emissions have increased by 43% per 
capita in Norway.123 This phenomenon is a possibility in the U.S. as 
well. It is possible that if the U.S. implements a carbon tax, 
companies could keep producing emissions at previous levels, and 
consumers could keep consuming at the same rate, in effect just 
absorbing the added cost.  
In Denmark, on the other hand, a carbon tax has led to emissions 
decreases of 15% from 1990 emissions levels.124 Denmark has made 
these reductions by returning much of the carbon tax revenue to the 
companies in the form of subsidies for research and investment in 
alternative energy technologies.125 This is a strategy policymakers 
could use in the United States as well. The United States could 
further incentivize emissions reductions by exempting companies 
that reduce their emissions from a certain amount of the tax each 
year. These reductions can be industry specific to make it fairer for 
industries that have difficulty reducing emissions.  
The contrast between the successful reductions in Denmark and 
the failure to reduce emissions in Norway highlights another 
criticized aspect of carbon taxes: the tax does not guarantee a 
                                                                                                             
 120. See OPEN EUROPE, supra note 66, at 33–40 (explaining the pitfalls of a 
cap-and-trade system based on allocating credits). See, e.g., id. at 36 (“Because 
companies in different member states are subject to different levels of stringency 
in their overall emissions caps and their entitlement to use (cheaper) Kyoto credits, 
there will be differentiated levels of ‘effort’ they need to make in order to comply 
with the ETS.”).  
 121. The reason this scheme would be less prone to lobbying, fraud, and 
corruption is because it is not susceptible to the same weaknesses as a cap-and-
trade scheme. See supra Part III.  
 122. See, e.g., Prasad, supra note 125.  
 123. Id.  
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reduction.126 Unlike a cap, which imposes an overall limit on 
emissions, companies subject to a tax can continue to pollute and 
just opt to pay the increasing carbon taxes if the conditions of the 
market warrant doing so. However, as previously discussed, the 
hope is that, by offering incentives to reduce carbon emissions and 
to invest in cleaner energy sources, overall carbon emissions would 
decrease. Also, if the desired decrease is not achieved, the carbon 
tax rate could be raised in response.127  
Detractors of a Denmark-style carbon tax point to the high cost 
of energy in that country as the reason for its emission reductions.128 
Indeed, in Denmark, energy prices are much higher than energy 
prices in the U.S., and this very well might be the cause of the 
reductions of carbon dioxide emissions in Denmark.129 Further, the 
high cost of energy in Denmark might provide another argument 
against implementing a carbon tax in the U.S. 
Another popular criticism of carbon taxes is that taxes of this 
sort are regressive, meaning that they disproportionately affect 
poorer consumers.130 Specifically, fossil fuel producers will pass the 
extra cost of these taxes on to the consumer, which hurts less 
wealthy consumers who cannot reduce their gasoline or electricity 
use as much as wealthy consumers who can afford to buy new more 
fuel-efficient cars or afford more energy-efficient appliances in their 
homes.131 One way to remedy this inequity would be to offer carbon 
                                                                                                             
 126. A tax would need to be high enough to change consumers’ behavior. See 
Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 18, at 46 (“The main substantive disadvantage 
of a carbon tax compared to cap and trade is Benefit Uncertainty. There can be no 
assurance that any given tax level will result in the desired reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions. If the desired benefit is not achieved, the tax may have to be raised, 
resulting in renewed political opposition, which could defeat the tax increase and 
thereby limit the environmental benefits of the tax.”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Jeff Rubin, Commentary, High Energy Prices Make Copenhagen Green, 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Sept. 1, 2010, 6:17 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com 
/report-on-business/commentary/jeff-rubins-smaller-world/high-energy-prices-
make-copenhagen-green/article1691382. 
 129. Id. (noting that electricity in Denmark costs anywhere from three to five 
times what the average North American would pay at 30 cents per kilowatt-hour). 
 130. See IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 22 (“Furthermore, 
emissions or energy taxes often fall disproportionately on lower income classes, 
thereby creating negative distributional consequences.”).  
 131. A similar tax proposed by President Clinton in 1993 was defeated at least in 
part because of claims that it would be regressive. Chris Casteel, Boren Targets 
Clinton Btu Tax with Own Plan, NEWSOK (May 21, 1993), http://newsok.com 
/boren-targets-clinton-btu-tax-with-own-plan/article/2431196 (“‘[Clinton’s proposed 
Btu tax] is terribly regressive. It affects the lower and middle-income people and, 
above all, it raises the cost of all our products in the world marketplace at a time 
when we're trying to regain our competitive positions,’ Boren said.”).  
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tax rebates to those individuals below a certain tax bracket. 
However, this once-a-year “fix” might not be sufficient to help those 
people living paycheck-to-paycheck.  
The main disadvantage of the carbon tax perhaps is its name: 
“tax.” The current political climate demonizes everything labeled a 
tax.132 Former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin and other conservative 
pundits have repeatedly referred to cap-and-trade as “cap-and-
tax.”133 Likewise, many members of the current Republican-
controlled House of Representatives were elected on campaign 
platforms based on lowering taxes or at least keeping taxes at their 
current rates. Calling a new carbon tax a “carbon fee” instead can 
remedy this stigma to some extent. Instituting a Denmark-style 
carbon tax could potentially fix the problem by returning most of the 
tax proceeds to the emitting industries so long as they invest in 
renewable energy sources.134 Additionally, a Denmark-style carbon 
tax would be less stifling to the industry and face the least amount of 
opposition from conservatives in Congress of all the forms of carbon 
taxes, but projected increases in energy costs should be closely 
scrutinized when considering this kind of tax. 
Regardless of these disadvantages, carbon taxes have received at 
least passing approval from even the staunchest of anti-tax lobbyists, 
Grover Norquist.135 This approval was based on instituting carbon 
taxes as a “carbon tax swap.”136 The attractiveness of a “swap” is 
that it could allow for a new tax on carbon emissions, as long as that 
new tax is accompanied by a tax reduction elsewhere.137 Therefore, 
                                                                                                             
 132. See Stavins, supra note 54, at 357 (claiming that the main disadvantage of 
a carbon tax is the overriding resistance to new taxes in the current political 
climate).  
 133. See Palin, supra note 111. 
 134. See Prasad, supra note 125 (characterizing Denmark’s successful carbon 
tax as one that “you want to impose but never collect”). 
 135. Coral Davenport, Norquist: Carbon-Tax Swap for Income-Tax Cut 
Wouldn't Violate No-Tax-Hike Pledge, NAT’L J. (Nov. 12, 2012, 5:09 PM), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com//energy/norquist-carbon-tax-swap-for-income-
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pledge.”). But see Chris Prandoni, Americans for Tax Reform Opposes a Carbon 
Tax, AMERICANS FOR TAX REFORM (Nov. 13, 2012, 9:27 AM), http://www.atr 
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a “swap” could allow Congress to pass a carbon tax despite the 
current anti-tax climate in Washington.138  
CONCLUSION 
The two best options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in 
the United States are a cap-and-trade system that auctions off carbon 
credits or a carbon tax. Denmark provides an example of a country 
that successfully cut national carbon dioxide emissions by instituting 
a carbon tax. On the other hand, cap-and-trade has not worked as 
designed in the past, and it is still largely untested in the United 
States. However, the Northeast’s RGGI offers a possible model for 
instituting an auction cap-and-trade system across the United States. 
The choice between the two schemes will be based on the specific 
terms of each. A carbon tax can work in the United States if the 
government offers the right incentives to participating companies 
and if the tax is not too high, but a carbon tax might not reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions at all. A cap-and-trade system could work 
in the United States if it were set up to avoid the problems 
associated with such systems in the past. A cap-and-trade system 
that gives away carbon credits is the least desirable method of 
reducing carbon emissions. Free Allocation schemes are prone to 
fraud and lobbying. Past examples have shown that they are 
probably the least efficient of the proposed methods. Regulating 
carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act does not seem to be the best 
option available because that Act is a poor fit for the goals of carbon 
dioxide emission reductions.  
The EPA has enacted regulatory measures under the Clean Air 
Act to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, but these will not be fast or 
far-reaching enough to be preferable to a carbon tax or a cap-and-
trade scheme. Between President Obama spending what political 
capital he has on other more popular issues and a Republican House 
of Representatives that seems opposed to all methods of carbon 
emission reduction, Congress seems unlikely to pass any 
environmental protection legislation to combat climate change in the 
near future. However, a carbon tax would incentivize reductions of 
emissions and would encourage technological innovations to reduce 
emissions. Additionally, a carbon tax might be able to pass in 
conjunction with a tax decrease elsewhere—in other words, even 
policymakers that categorically refuse to raise taxes may be willing 
to introduce a carbon tax if it is coupled with tax reductions 
elsewhere. (The flexibility of this sort of “swap” would make 
instituting a carbon tax a good option for combating climate 
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change.) After considering traditional options for reducing carbon 
emissions, recent trends in policy seem to suggest that the passage 
of a carbon tax would be a logical, and perhaps politically agreeable, 
step toward solving the climate crisis. 
  
